Duración: 2016-2017

Código:  20167047

Investigador principal:

Santiago Arango Muñoz, santiago.arango5@udea.edu.co

Equipo de investigación:

Sebastián Mejía Rendón (Joven investigador)

Daniela Galvis Quintana (Estudiante en formación de pregrado)

Luisa Fernanda Gómez (Estudiante en formación de pregrado)

Resumen: The aim of this project is to study the relationship between metacognitive feelings and the cognitive phenomenology thesis. The cognitive phenomenology thesis claims that there is something it is like to have cognitive states; mental states such as believing, desiring, hoping, attending, and so on, have a particular phenomenology that subjects can introspect (Strawson, 2011, Pitt, 2004). For instance, there is something it is like to think that it rains different to judging that it rains; that is, there is a phenomenological difference between different attitudes that are directed towards the same content. This thesis has been sometimes associated to metacognitive feelings, after Goldman’s (1993) claim that the Tip-of-the-Tongue phenomenon is an instance of cognitive phenomenology (some litterature on the tip-of-the-tongue: Brown 1966; Schwartz 2002; Brown 2012; Schwartz & Metcalfe 2011 for a recent review). However, it is important to highlight that the accounts of metacognitive feelings defended by most philosophers (e.g., de Sousa, 2009; Dokic 2012; Arango-Muñoz 2014) is independent from the truth or falsity of the cognitive phenomenology thesis. That is, it might turn out that there are metacognitive feelings, which are phenomenal, but no cognitive states (such beliefs or desires) with proper intrinsic phenomenology. So, even if the cognitive phenomenology thesis turned out to be false, metacognitive feelings could still be considered phenomenal states that point to, or are directed at non-phenomenal states such as beliefs, judgments, non-episodic memories, etc. The phenomenological observations, the functional role, and the empirical data that one can cite to defend each of these theses are independent and should not be conflated. 

Objetivos:

• To clearly delimit both the cognitive phenomenology thesis and the metacognitive feelings thesis and also to determine where they converge and where they differ.
• To propose a different methodology to approach this discussion: rather than taking the current a priori method of introspection used by most philosophers, I’ll propose a method that grounds philosophical reflection on data from Cognitive Science and Neuroscience.
• To improve our understanding of epistemic feelings, their role within the mind, and their natural underpinings.

Palabras clave: feelings cognitive phenomenology, introspection,  feeling of knowing